为什么录音录像制品的出租不需要经过著作权人同意/董世连
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为什么录音录像制品的出租不需要经过著作权人同意
董世连
咨询：复制、发行、网络传播录音录像制品还应当取得著作权人、表演者许可并支付报酬，而出租只要经制作者许可。不明白。有什么立法原理？
回复：您好，《著作权法》第41条第一款明确了录音录像制作者享有的权利，其中包括出租权。但是录音录像制作者享有的权利是一项邻接权，被许可人复制、发行、通过信息网络向公众传播录音录像制品，还应当取得著作权人、表演者许可，并支付报酬。（41条第二款的规定）
但是录音录像制作者许可他人出租录音录像制品并不需要取得著作权人、表演者许可，这是因为，根据著作权法第十条第七项中的规定，著作权人只对电影作品和以类似摄制电影的方法创作的作品、计算机软件享有出租权，对录音制品没有出租权，表演者也无此权利。因此，录音录像制作者许可他人出租录音录像制品可以不经著作权人、表演者许可。
附：《著作权法》第四十一条 录音录像制作者对其制作的录音录像制品，享有许可他人复制、发行、出租、通过信息网络向公众传播并获得报酬的权利；权利的保护期为五十年，截止于该制品首次制作完成后第五十年的12月31日。
被许可人复制、发行、通过信息网络向公众传播录音录像制品，还应当取得著作权人、表演者许可，并支付报酬。
第十条 (七)出租权，即有偿许可他人临时使用电影作品和以类似摄制电影的方法创作的作品、计算机软件的权利，计算机软件不是出租的主要标的的除外。
作 者：董世连，北京浩然律师事务所知识产权部主任、律师
电 话：13910629206，邮箱：dsldls@126.com QQ:269907836
个人博客：http://blog.sina.com.cn/donglvshi
董世连
咨询：复制、发行、网络传播录音录像制品还应当取得著作权人、表演者许可并支付报酬，而出租只要经制作者许可。不明白。有什么立法原理？
回复：您好，《著作权法》第41条第一款明确了录音录像制作者享有的权利，其中包括出租权。但是录音录像制作者享有的权利是一项邻接权，被许可人复制、发行、通过信息网络向公众传播录音录像制品，还应当取得著作权人、表演者许可，并支付报酬。（41条第二款的规定）
但是录音录像制作者许可他人出租录音录像制品并不需要取得著作权人、表演者许可，这是因为，根据著作权法第十条第七项中的规定，著作权人只对电影作品和以类似摄制电影的方法创作的作品、计算机软件享有出租权，对录音制品没有出租权，表演者也无此权利。因此，录音录像制作者许可他人出租录音录像制品可以不经著作权人、表演者许可。
附：《著作权法》第四十一条 录音录像制作者对其制作的录音录像制品，享有许可他人复制、发行、出租、通过信息网络向公众传播并获得报酬的权利；权利的保护期为五十年，截止于该制品首次制作完成后第五十年的12月31日。
被许可人复制、发行、通过信息网络向公众传播录音录像制品，还应当取得著作权人、表演者许可，并支付报酬。
第十条 (七)出租权，即有偿许可他人临时使用电影作品和以类似摄制电影的方法创作的作品、计算机软件的权利，计算机软件不是出租的主要标的的除外。
作 者：董世连，北京浩然律师事务所知识产权部主任、律师
电 话：13910629206，邮箱：dsldls@126.com QQ:269907836
个人博客：http://blog.sina.com.cn/donglvshi
下载地址: 点击此处下载
《反不正当竞争法》的一般条款及其适用
——搜索引擎爬虫协议引发的思考
张平. 北京大学法学院
互联网的蓬勃发展给企业带来生机同时也产生了前所未有的激烈的市场竞争，相对于互联网发展的速度，立法相对滞后。考察我国目前对于互联网行业竞争行为的规制现状，可以发现，相关法律法规具有明显的反应性与被动型，并且存在不足。可以说，互联网的发展推动着立法的完善，技术的进步是互联网法律发展的动力。我国在1993年出台了《反不正当竞争法》，在2000年颁布了《中华人民共和国电信条例》和《互联网信息服务管理办法》，迫于360公司与腾讯公司之间“3Q”大战引发的压力，在2011年，工信部出台了《互联网信息服务市场秩序监督管理暂行办法（征求意见稿）》，2012年6月，国务院出台了 《互联网信息服务管理办法 （修订草案征求意见稿）》。2012年8月以来，随着百度与360公司关于搜索引擎爬虫行为争议引发的“3B”大战，又将互联网多年遵循的处于后台的行业惯例（即“爬虫协议”）的法律效力问题推到了前台，在无法寻找到直接的法律规范的情况下，能否在现有法律中如《反不正竞争法》寻找解决问题的途径成为讨论的热点。
《反不正当竞争法》由于颁布时间过早 ，对于之后的技术发展很难有预见性，其规定的具体不正当竞争行为很难适用于如今的互联网领域。因此，大家都将目光投向了《反不正当竞争法》的一般条款，试图通过适用一般条款，对互联网的竞争行为进行规制。
一、基于《反不正当竞争法》的法理分析
（一）《反不正当竞争法》对于商业道德的保护
对于何为不正当竞争行为，我国和大多数国家一样，采用了概括和列举相结合的立法技术来规定不正当竞争行为。[1]我国《反不正当竞争法》第2条第1款规定，“经营者在市场交易中，应当遵循自愿、平等、公平、诚实信用的原则，遵守公认的商业道德。”第2款规定，“本法所称不正当竞争行为，是指经营者违反本法规定，损害其他经营者的合法权益，扰乱社会经济秩序的行为”。在原则性的规定以外，《反不正当竞争法》 还在第二章列举了11种不正当竞争行为，包括仿冒、限制竞争、权力经营、商业贿赂、虚假广告、侵犯商业秘密、倾销、不正当附条件销售行为、不当有奖销售、损害商业以及串通投标。
但是这是否意味着我国《反不正当竞争法》就存在所谓的一般条款在学界仍有争论。目前主要有三派观点，即“一般条款说”、“法定主义说”以及“有限的一般条款说”。
“一般条款说”认为《反不正当竞争法》所调整不正当竞争行为应当不限于第2章所列举的11种行为，它还包括该法总则尤其是第2条第2款的规定所认定的行为。“法定主义说”则持相反意见，理由在于：第一，法条通过“违反本法规定”的表述限定了该条款乃至该法的适用范围；第二，从法律条文的一般关系看，通常确立“一般条款”的立法，都会在下文列举不正当竞争行为的类型时添加类似“其他不正当竞争行为”的兜底性条款，而我国并没有这样的规定。[2]“有限的一般条款说”认为，司法机关可以据此认定不正当竞争行为，但行政机关不能依据该条认定不正当竞争行为，该条只对司法机关有意义，对行政机关不具有意义。[3]
笔者赞同“有限的一般条款说”。我国《反不正当竞争法》已经颁布实施十几年，实际情况发生了极大的变化，采用“法定主义说”将会对《反不正当竞争法》的适用造成极大的限制，不符合现实情况。“一般条款说”过于灵活，如果不加限制地赋予执法机关根据个案随时认定不正当竞争行为的权力，会导致行政权力的滥用。同时，由于《反不正当竞争法》第4章所规定的法律责任与第2章相对应，第2条的规定很难适用。因此，《反不正当竞争法》的第2条是一个“有限的一般条款”。该条款对于不同的竞争行为具有不同的意义，有学者认为：第一，对于须予以行政处罚而《反不正当竞争法》又未列举的不正当竞争行为，按照一般条款将其确定为不正当竞争行为没有意义，除非行政法规、地方性法规另有规定。第二，对于受害人请求赔偿，而《反不正当竞争法》又未列举的不正当竞争行为，任何一级法院可以根据个案将其确认为不正当竞争行为，判令行为人承担民事责任。[4]依据以上观点的分析，我国《反不正当竞争法》第二章所列举的11种具体的不正当竞争行为中并不包括对违反一般商业道德行为的规制。因此，如果试图通过《反不正当竞争法》寻求对商业道德的保护，就必须适用其一般条款。
一般条款中对于商业道德的保护在反不正当竞争法中所扮演的角色十分重要。可以说，反不正当竞争法的精髓是维护商业伦理或者商业道德，这与维护竞争自由的反垄断法形成鲜明的对比。[5]我国《反不正当竞争法》的第1条对该法的立法目的作出了规定 ，即“保障社会主义市场经济健康发展，鼓励和保护公平竞争，制止不正当竞争行为，保护经营者和消费者的合法权益”是我国《反不正当竞争法》所要达到的目标。可以看出，该立法目的体现的是对于市场经济发展的维护、对经营者与消费者利益的保障，是一种对于商业道德的维护。这种对于商业道德维护的立法精神在第2条体现的更为明显，该法第2条第1款规定了“经营者在市场交易中，应当遵循自愿、平等、公平、诚实信用的原则，遵守公认的商业道德”的基本原则。该法第2条也被普遍认为是我国《反不正当竞争法》的一般条款，对于社会主义市场经济的健康发展具有重要意义。
如前所述，《反不正当竞争法》 的主要立法目的和基本原则就是维护商业伦理。《保护工业产权巴黎公约》第10条之二所规定的，不正当竞争是指“在工商业活动中违反诚实惯例的任何竞争行为”，“违反诚实惯例”是判断竞争行为是否正当的基本标准。[6]而在判断竞争行为时，这种“诚实惯例”的标准是一种道德标准。
因此，对于不正当竞争行为的考量，尤其涉及对于商业道德的保护，应该适用《反不正当竞争法》的一般条款，在适用一般条款是，我们需要注意一般条款的适用范围边界，防止对于法律的扩大适用。
（二）一般条款的定义及适用
1.一般条款的定义
通常所说的法律上的一般条款，主流观点比较认同由日本法学家我妻荣主编的《新法律学词典》对于一般条款的定义，“一般条款又称为概括性条款，大致在两种意义上使用。（1）把法律上的要件制定为抽象的、一般的规定。其具体适用听任法官，具有灵活性，在根据社会情况变化可追求妥当性这一点上，是有特点的。私法上多用于这一意义。（2）公法上，例如‘认为公益上有需要时’，指以不确定的概念为行政行为要件规定，也还有把与一定情形有关的情况统一整理为对象的规定。”对于《反不正当竞争法》所涉的一般条款，孔祥俊认为，反不正当竞争法上的一般条款即规定执法机关或者法院，在法律具体列举的不正当竞争行为以外认定其他不正当竞争行为的要件的抽象的或者概括的规范。[7]
2.一般条款的适用范围
（1）基本要求
对于《反不正当竞争法》一般条款的适用应满足以下基本要求：①贯彻《反不正当竞争法》的立法宗旨；②把握《反不正当竞争法》一般条款的核心原则；③进行利弊权衡。
《反不正当竞争法》的宗旨由该法的第1条予以规定，即“保障社会主义市场经济健康发展，鼓励和保护公平竞争，制止不正当竞争行为，保护经营者和消费者的合法权益”。因此，在适用一般条款时，应当考虑不正当行为是否有损于社会主义市场经济的健康发展，是否产生了不正当竞争，是否侵害了经营者和消费者的合法权益。
一般条款的核心原则包括诚实信用和遵守商业道德。二者是判断竞争行为是否正当的基础。当面临某一竞争行为是否构成《反不正当竞争法》意义上的不正当竞争行为时，应考量其是否违背了诚实信用原则或违背了基本的商业道德。对于诚实信用原则和商业道德的进一步解释将在下文进行论述。
进行利弊权衡是指法官应以《反不正当竞争法》的立法目的为主导，综合考虑竞争主体、消费者和社会公共利益，按一般条款规定的原则判断究竟应注重哪一方的利益。[8]进行利弊权衡的同时，需要强调的是必须以前两项基本要求为基础，否则容易导致一般条款的适用偏差。
（2）一般要件
如前所述，对我国《反不正当竞争法》应采取“有限的一般条款说”，其适用依赖于最高人民法院对于一般条款的解释。
最高人民法院在“山东省食品进出口公司、山东山孚集团有限公司、山东山孚日水有限公司与马达庆、青岛圣克达诚贸易有限公司不正当竞争纠纷案”[9]（以下简称“海带配额”案）中对我国《反不正当竞争法》一般条款的适用作出了解释，认为适用《反不正当竞争法》第2条应具备以下条件：①法律对该种竞争行为未作出特别规定；②使其他经营者的合法权益确因该竞争行为而受到了实际损害；③该种竞争行为因确属违反诚实信用原则和公认的商业道德而具有不正当性或者说可责性。
Chapter VIII
Strengthening of the Multilateral System
Art. 23 of the DSU deals, as indicated by its title, with the “Strengthening of the Multilateral System”. Its overall design is to prevent WTO Members from unilaterally resolving their disputes in respect of WTO rights and obligations. It does so by obligating Members to follow the multilateral rules and procedures of the DSU. Art. 23 of the DSU reads:
“Strengthening of the Multilateral System
1. When Members seek the redress of a violation of obligations or other nullification or impairment of benefits under the covered agreements or an impediment to the attainment of any objective of the covered agreements, they shall have recourse to, and abide by, the rules and procedures of this Understanding.
2. In such cases, Members shall:
(a) not make a determination to the effect that a violation has occurred, that benefits have been nullified or impaired or that the attainment of any objective of the covered agreements has been impeded, except through recourse to dispute settlement in accordance with the rules and procedures of this Understanding, and shall make any such determination consistent with the findings contained in the panel or Appellate Body report adopted by the DSB or an arbitration award rendered under this Understanding;
(b) follow the procedures set forth in Article 21 to determine the reasonable period of time for the Member concerned to implement the recommendations and rulings; and
(c) follow the procedures set forth in Article 22 to determine the level of suspension of concessions or other obligations and obtain DSB authorization in accordance with those procedures before suspending concessions or other obligations under the covered agreements in response to the failure of the Member concerned to implement the recommendations and rulings within that reasonable period of time.”
In this section, to end this book, the author means to take a precise overlook on the nature of obligations under Art. 23 of the DSU as a whole by referring to two panels’ reports in part. In this respect, the Panel in US-Sections 301-310 (DS152) rules: 1
“On this basis [provision of Article 23], we conclude as follows:
(a)It is for the WTO through the DSU process - not for an individual WTO Member - to determine that a WTO inconsistency has occurred (Article 23.2(a)).
(b)It is for the WTO or both of the disputing parties, through the procedures set forth in Article 21 - not for an individual WTO Member - to determine the reasonable period of time for the Member concerned to implement DSB recommendations and rulings (Article 23.2(b)).
(c)It is for the WTO through the procedures set forth in Article 22 - not for an individual WTO Member - to determine, in the event of disagreement, the level of suspension of concessions or other obligations that can be imposed as a result of a WTO inconsistency, as well as to grant authorization for the actual implementation of these suspensions.
Article 23.2 clearly, thus, prohibits specific instances of unilateral conduct by WTO Members when they seek redress for WTO inconsistencies in any given dispute. This is, in our view, the first type of obligations covered under Article 23.
Article 23.1 is not concerned only with specific instances of violation. It prescribes a general duty of a dual nature. First, it imposes on all Members to ‘have recourse to’ the multilateral process set out in the DSU when they seek the redress of a WTO inconsistency. In these circumstances, Members have to have recourse to the DSU dispute settlement system to the exclusion of any other system, in particular a system of unilateral enforcement of WTO rights and obligations. This, what one could call ‘exclusive dispute resolution clause’, is an important new element of Members' rights and obligations under the DSU. Second, Article 23.1 also prescribes that Members, when they have recourse to the dispute settlement system in the DSU, have to ‘abide by’ the rules and procedures set out in the DSU. This second obligation under Article 23.1 is of a confirmatory nature: when having recourse to the DSU Members must abide by all DSU rules and procedures.
Turning to the second paragraph under Article 23, Article 23.2 - which, on its face, addresses conduct in specific disputes - starts with the words ‘[i]n such cases’. It is, thus, explicitly linked to, and has to be read together with and subject to, Article 23.1.
Indeed, two of the three prohibitions mentioned in Article 23.2 - Article 23.2(b) and (c) - are but egregious examples of conduct that contradicts the rules and procedures of the DSU which, under the obligation in Article 23.1 to ‘abide by the rules and procedures’ of the DSU, Members are obligated to follow. These rules and procedures clearly cover much more than the ones specifically mentioned in Article 23.2. There is a great deal more State conduct which can violate the general obligation in Article 23.1 to have recourse to, and abide by, the rules and procedures of the DSU than the instances especially singled out in Article 23.2.
Article 23 interdicts, thus, more than action in specific disputes, it also provides discipline for the general process WTO Members must follow when seeking redress of WTO inconsistencies. A violation of the explicit provisions of Article 23 can, therefore, be of two different kinds. It can be caused
(a)by an ad hoc, specific action in a given dispute, or
(b)by measures of general applicability, e.g. legislation or regulations, providing for a certain process to be followed which does not, say, include recourse to the DSU dispute settlement system or abide by the rules and procedures of the DSU.”
Furthermore, as to Art. 23 of the DSU, the Panel in US-Import Measures (DS165) confirms the ruling developed in US-Sections 301-310, and states: 2
“The Panel believes that the adopted Panel Report on United States - Sections 301-310 of the Trade Act of 1974 (‘US - Section 301’) has confirmed the crucial importance that WTO Members place on the dispute settlement system of the WTO, as the exclusive means to redress any violations of any provisions of the WTO Agreement. This fundamental principle is embedded in Article 23 of the DSU: …
An important reason why Article 23 of the DSU must be interpreted with a view to prohibiting any form of unilateral action is because such unilateral actions threaten the stability and predictability of the multilateral trade system, a necessary component for "market conditions conducive to individual economic activity in national and global markets" which, in themselves, constitute a fundamental goal of the WTO. Unilateral actions are, therefore, contrary to the essence of the multilateral trade system of the WTO. As stated in the Panel Report on US - Section 301:
‘7.75 Providing security and predictability to the multilateral trading system is another central object and purpose of the system which could be instrumental to achieving the broad objectives of the Preamble. Of all WTO disciplines, the DSU is one of the most important instruments to protect the security and predictability of the multilateral trading system and through it that of the market-place and its different operators. DSU provisions must, thus, be interpreted in the light of this object and purpose and in a manner which would most effectively enhance it.’
The structure of Article 23 is that the first paragraph states the general prohibition or general obligation, i.e. when Members seek the redress of a WTO violation, they shall do so only through the DSU. This is a general obligation. Any attempt to seek ‘redress’ can take place only in the institutional framework of the WTO and pursuant to the rules and procedures of the DSU.
The prohibition against unilateral redress in the WTO sectors is more directly provided for in the second paragraph of Article 23. From the ordinary meaning of the terms used in the chapeau of Article 23.2 (‘in such cases, Members shall’), it is also clear that the second paragraph of Article 23 is ‘explicitly linked to, and has to be read together with and subject to, Article 23.1’. That is to say, the specific prohibitions of paragraph 2 of Article 23 have to be understood in the context of the first paragraph, i.e. when such action is performed by a WTO Member with a view to redressing a WTO violation.
We also agree with the US - Section 301 Panel Report that Article 23.2 contains ‘egregious examples of conduct that contradict the rules of the DSU’ and which constitute more specific forms of unilateral actions, otherwise generally prohibited by Article 23.1 of the DSU.
‘[t]hese rules and procedures [Article 23.1] clearly cover much more than the ones specifically mentioned in Article 23.2. There is a great deal more State conduct which can violate the general obligation in Article 23.1 to have recourse to, and abide by, the rules and procedures of the DSU than the instances especially singled out in Article 23.2.’
The same Panel identified a few examples of such instances where the DSU could be violated contrary to the provisions of Article 23. Each time a Member seeking the redress of a WTO violation is not abiding by a rule of the DSU, it thus violates Article 23.1 of the DSU.
In order to verify whether individual provisions of Article 23.2 have been infringed (keeping in mind that the obligation to also observe other DSU provisions can be brought under the umbrella of Article 23.1), we must first determine whether the measure at issue comes under the coverage of Article 23.1. In other words, we need to determine whether Article 23 is applicable to the dispute before addressing the specific violations envisaged in the second paragraph of Article 23 of the DSU or elsewhere in the DSU.
Article 23.1 of the DSU provides that the criterion for determining whether Article 23 is applicable is whether the Member that imposed the measure was ‘seeking the redress of’ a WTO violation. …
The term ‘seeking’ or ‘to seek’ is defined in the Webster New Encyclopedic Dictionary as: ‘to resort to, … to make an attempt, try’. This term would therefore cover situations where an effort is made to redress WTO violations (whether perceived or WTO determined violations). The term ‘to redress’ is defined in the New Shorter Oxford English Dictionary as ‘repair (an action); atone for (a misdeed); remedy or remove; to set right or rectify (injury, a wrong, a grievance etc.); obtaining reparation or compensation’. The term ‘redress’ is defined in the New Shorter Oxford English Dictionary as: ‘reparation of or compensation for a wrong or consequent loss; remedy for or relief from some trouble; correction or reformation of something wrong’. The term 'redress' implies, therefore, a reaction by a Member against another Member, because of a perceived (or WTO determined) WTO violation, with a view to remedying the situation.
Article 23.1 of the DSU prescribes that when a WTO Member wants to take any remedial action in response to what it views as a WTO violation, it is obligated to have recourse to and abide by the DSU rules and procedures. In case of a grievance on a WTO matter, the WTO dispute settlement mechanism is the only means available to WTO Members to obtain relief, and only the remedial actions envisaged in the WTO system can be used by WTO Members. The remedial actions relate to restoring the balance of rights and obligations which form the basis of the WTO Agreement, and include the removal of the inconsistent measure, the possibility of (temporary) compensation and, in last resort, the (temporary) suspension of concessions or other obligations authorised by the DSB (Articles 3.7 and 22.1 of the DSU). The latter remedy is essentially retaliatory in nature.”
【NOTE】:
1. See, in detail, WT/DS152/R/7.38-7.46.
2. See, in detail, WT/DS165/R/6.13-6.23.
List of References
1 Sources of Legal Texts: http://www.wto.org; WTO Secretariat: The WTO Dispute Settlement Procedures (Second Edition), CAMBRIDGE UNIVERSITY PRESS, 2001.
——搜索引擎爬虫协议引发的思考
张平. 北京大学法学院
互联网的蓬勃发展给企业带来生机同时也产生了前所未有的激烈的市场竞争，相对于互联网发展的速度，立法相对滞后。考察我国目前对于互联网行业竞争行为的规制现状，可以发现，相关法律法规具有明显的反应性与被动型，并且存在不足。可以说，互联网的发展推动着立法的完善，技术的进步是互联网法律发展的动力。我国在1993年出台了《反不正当竞争法》，在2000年颁布了《中华人民共和国电信条例》和《互联网信息服务管理办法》，迫于360公司与腾讯公司之间“3Q”大战引发的压力，在2011年，工信部出台了《互联网信息服务市场秩序监督管理暂行办法（征求意见稿）》，2012年6月，国务院出台了 《互联网信息服务管理办法 （修订草案征求意见稿）》。2012年8月以来，随着百度与360公司关于搜索引擎爬虫行为争议引发的“3B”大战，又将互联网多年遵循的处于后台的行业惯例（即“爬虫协议”）的法律效力问题推到了前台，在无法寻找到直接的法律规范的情况下，能否在现有法律中如《反不正竞争法》寻找解决问题的途径成为讨论的热点。
《反不正当竞争法》由于颁布时间过早 ，对于之后的技术发展很难有预见性，其规定的具体不正当竞争行为很难适用于如今的互联网领域。因此，大家都将目光投向了《反不正当竞争法》的一般条款，试图通过适用一般条款，对互联网的竞争行为进行规制。
一、基于《反不正当竞争法》的法理分析
（一）《反不正当竞争法》对于商业道德的保护
对于何为不正当竞争行为，我国和大多数国家一样，采用了概括和列举相结合的立法技术来规定不正当竞争行为。[1]我国《反不正当竞争法》第2条第1款规定，“经营者在市场交易中，应当遵循自愿、平等、公平、诚实信用的原则，遵守公认的商业道德。”第2款规定，“本法所称不正当竞争行为，是指经营者违反本法规定，损害其他经营者的合法权益，扰乱社会经济秩序的行为”。在原则性的规定以外，《反不正当竞争法》 还在第二章列举了11种不正当竞争行为，包括仿冒、限制竞争、权力经营、商业贿赂、虚假广告、侵犯商业秘密、倾销、不正当附条件销售行为、不当有奖销售、损害商业以及串通投标。
但是这是否意味着我国《反不正当竞争法》就存在所谓的一般条款在学界仍有争论。目前主要有三派观点，即“一般条款说”、“法定主义说”以及“有限的一般条款说”。
“一般条款说”认为《反不正当竞争法》所调整不正当竞争行为应当不限于第2章所列举的11种行为，它还包括该法总则尤其是第2条第2款的规定所认定的行为。“法定主义说”则持相反意见，理由在于：第一，法条通过“违反本法规定”的表述限定了该条款乃至该法的适用范围；第二，从法律条文的一般关系看，通常确立“一般条款”的立法，都会在下文列举不正当竞争行为的类型时添加类似“其他不正当竞争行为”的兜底性条款，而我国并没有这样的规定。[2]“有限的一般条款说”认为，司法机关可以据此认定不正当竞争行为，但行政机关不能依据该条认定不正当竞争行为，该条只对司法机关有意义，对行政机关不具有意义。[3]
笔者赞同“有限的一般条款说”。我国《反不正当竞争法》已经颁布实施十几年，实际情况发生了极大的变化，采用“法定主义说”将会对《反不正当竞争法》的适用造成极大的限制，不符合现实情况。“一般条款说”过于灵活，如果不加限制地赋予执法机关根据个案随时认定不正当竞争行为的权力，会导致行政权力的滥用。同时，由于《反不正当竞争法》第4章所规定的法律责任与第2章相对应，第2条的规定很难适用。因此，《反不正当竞争法》的第2条是一个“有限的一般条款”。该条款对于不同的竞争行为具有不同的意义，有学者认为：第一，对于须予以行政处罚而《反不正当竞争法》又未列举的不正当竞争行为，按照一般条款将其确定为不正当竞争行为没有意义，除非行政法规、地方性法规另有规定。第二，对于受害人请求赔偿，而《反不正当竞争法》又未列举的不正当竞争行为，任何一级法院可以根据个案将其确认为不正当竞争行为，判令行为人承担民事责任。[4]依据以上观点的分析，我国《反不正当竞争法》第二章所列举的11种具体的不正当竞争行为中并不包括对违反一般商业道德行为的规制。因此，如果试图通过《反不正当竞争法》寻求对商业道德的保护，就必须适用其一般条款。
一般条款中对于商业道德的保护在反不正当竞争法中所扮演的角色十分重要。可以说，反不正当竞争法的精髓是维护商业伦理或者商业道德，这与维护竞争自由的反垄断法形成鲜明的对比。[5]我国《反不正当竞争法》的第1条对该法的立法目的作出了规定 ，即“保障社会主义市场经济健康发展，鼓励和保护公平竞争，制止不正当竞争行为，保护经营者和消费者的合法权益”是我国《反不正当竞争法》所要达到的目标。可以看出，该立法目的体现的是对于市场经济发展的维护、对经营者与消费者利益的保障，是一种对于商业道德的维护。这种对于商业道德维护的立法精神在第2条体现的更为明显，该法第2条第1款规定了“经营者在市场交易中，应当遵循自愿、平等、公平、诚实信用的原则，遵守公认的商业道德”的基本原则。该法第2条也被普遍认为是我国《反不正当竞争法》的一般条款，对于社会主义市场经济的健康发展具有重要意义。
如前所述，《反不正当竞争法》 的主要立法目的和基本原则就是维护商业伦理。《保护工业产权巴黎公约》第10条之二所规定的，不正当竞争是指“在工商业活动中违反诚实惯例的任何竞争行为”，“违反诚实惯例”是判断竞争行为是否正当的基本标准。[6]而在判断竞争行为时，这种“诚实惯例”的标准是一种道德标准。
因此，对于不正当竞争行为的考量，尤其涉及对于商业道德的保护，应该适用《反不正当竞争法》的一般条款，在适用一般条款是，我们需要注意一般条款的适用范围边界，防止对于法律的扩大适用。
（二）一般条款的定义及适用
1.一般条款的定义
通常所说的法律上的一般条款，主流观点比较认同由日本法学家我妻荣主编的《新法律学词典》对于一般条款的定义，“一般条款又称为概括性条款，大致在两种意义上使用。（1）把法律上的要件制定为抽象的、一般的规定。其具体适用听任法官，具有灵活性，在根据社会情况变化可追求妥当性这一点上，是有特点的。私法上多用于这一意义。（2）公法上，例如‘认为公益上有需要时’，指以不确定的概念为行政行为要件规定，也还有把与一定情形有关的情况统一整理为对象的规定。”对于《反不正当竞争法》所涉的一般条款，孔祥俊认为，反不正当竞争法上的一般条款即规定执法机关或者法院，在法律具体列举的不正当竞争行为以外认定其他不正当竞争行为的要件的抽象的或者概括的规范。[7]
2.一般条款的适用范围
（1）基本要求
对于《反不正当竞争法》一般条款的适用应满足以下基本要求：①贯彻《反不正当竞争法》的立法宗旨；②把握《反不正当竞争法》一般条款的核心原则；③进行利弊权衡。
《反不正当竞争法》的宗旨由该法的第1条予以规定，即“保障社会主义市场经济健康发展，鼓励和保护公平竞争，制止不正当竞争行为，保护经营者和消费者的合法权益”。因此，在适用一般条款时，应当考虑不正当行为是否有损于社会主义市场经济的健康发展，是否产生了不正当竞争，是否侵害了经营者和消费者的合法权益。
一般条款的核心原则包括诚实信用和遵守商业道德。二者是判断竞争行为是否正当的基础。当面临某一竞争行为是否构成《反不正当竞争法》意义上的不正当竞争行为时，应考量其是否违背了诚实信用原则或违背了基本的商业道德。对于诚实信用原则和商业道德的进一步解释将在下文进行论述。
进行利弊权衡是指法官应以《反不正当竞争法》的立法目的为主导，综合考虑竞争主体、消费者和社会公共利益，按一般条款规定的原则判断究竟应注重哪一方的利益。[8]进行利弊权衡的同时，需要强调的是必须以前两项基本要求为基础，否则容易导致一般条款的适用偏差。
（2）一般要件
如前所述，对我国《反不正当竞争法》应采取“有限的一般条款说”，其适用依赖于最高人民法院对于一般条款的解释。
最高人民法院在“山东省食品进出口公司、山东山孚集团有限公司、山东山孚日水有限公司与马达庆、青岛圣克达诚贸易有限公司不正当竞争纠纷案”[9]（以下简称“海带配额”案）中对我国《反不正当竞争法》一般条款的适用作出了解释，认为适用《反不正当竞争法》第2条应具备以下条件：①法律对该种竞争行为未作出特别规定；②使其他经营者的合法权益确因该竞争行为而受到了实际损害；③该种竞争行为因确属违反诚实信用原则和公认的商业道德而具有不正当性或者说可责性。
Chapter VIII
Strengthening of the Multilateral System
Art. 23 of the DSU deals, as indicated by its title, with the “Strengthening of the Multilateral System”. Its overall design is to prevent WTO Members from unilaterally resolving their disputes in respect of WTO rights and obligations. It does so by obligating Members to follow the multilateral rules and procedures of the DSU. Art. 23 of the DSU reads:
“Strengthening of the Multilateral System
1. When Members seek the redress of a violation of obligations or other nullification or impairment of benefits under the covered agreements or an impediment to the attainment of any objective of the covered agreements, they shall have recourse to, and abide by, the rules and procedures of this Understanding.
2. In such cases, Members shall:
(a) not make a determination to the effect that a violation has occurred, that benefits have been nullified or impaired or that the attainment of any objective of the covered agreements has been impeded, except through recourse to dispute settlement in accordance with the rules and procedures of this Understanding, and shall make any such determination consistent with the findings contained in the panel or Appellate Body report adopted by the DSB or an arbitration award rendered under this Understanding;
(b) follow the procedures set forth in Article 21 to determine the reasonable period of time for the Member concerned to implement the recommendations and rulings; and
(c) follow the procedures set forth in Article 22 to determine the level of suspension of concessions or other obligations and obtain DSB authorization in accordance with those procedures before suspending concessions or other obligations under the covered agreements in response to the failure of the Member concerned to implement the recommendations and rulings within that reasonable period of time.”
In this section, to end this book, the author means to take a precise overlook on the nature of obligations under Art. 23 of the DSU as a whole by referring to two panels’ reports in part. In this respect, the Panel in US-Sections 301-310 (DS152) rules: 1
“On this basis [provision of Article 23], we conclude as follows:
(a)It is for the WTO through the DSU process - not for an individual WTO Member - to determine that a WTO inconsistency has occurred (Article 23.2(a)).
(b)It is for the WTO or both of the disputing parties, through the procedures set forth in Article 21 - not for an individual WTO Member - to determine the reasonable period of time for the Member concerned to implement DSB recommendations and rulings (Article 23.2(b)).
(c)It is for the WTO through the procedures set forth in Article 22 - not for an individual WTO Member - to determine, in the event of disagreement, the level of suspension of concessions or other obligations that can be imposed as a result of a WTO inconsistency, as well as to grant authorization for the actual implementation of these suspensions.
Article 23.2 clearly, thus, prohibits specific instances of unilateral conduct by WTO Members when they seek redress for WTO inconsistencies in any given dispute. This is, in our view, the first type of obligations covered under Article 23.
Article 23.1 is not concerned only with specific instances of violation. It prescribes a general duty of a dual nature. First, it imposes on all Members to ‘have recourse to’ the multilateral process set out in the DSU when they seek the redress of a WTO inconsistency. In these circumstances, Members have to have recourse to the DSU dispute settlement system to the exclusion of any other system, in particular a system of unilateral enforcement of WTO rights and obligations. This, what one could call ‘exclusive dispute resolution clause’, is an important new element of Members' rights and obligations under the DSU. Second, Article 23.1 also prescribes that Members, when they have recourse to the dispute settlement system in the DSU, have to ‘abide by’ the rules and procedures set out in the DSU. This second obligation under Article 23.1 is of a confirmatory nature: when having recourse to the DSU Members must abide by all DSU rules and procedures.
Turning to the second paragraph under Article 23, Article 23.2 - which, on its face, addresses conduct in specific disputes - starts with the words ‘[i]n such cases’. It is, thus, explicitly linked to, and has to be read together with and subject to, Article 23.1.
Indeed, two of the three prohibitions mentioned in Article 23.2 - Article 23.2(b) and (c) - are but egregious examples of conduct that contradicts the rules and procedures of the DSU which, under the obligation in Article 23.1 to ‘abide by the rules and procedures’ of the DSU, Members are obligated to follow. These rules and procedures clearly cover much more than the ones specifically mentioned in Article 23.2. There is a great deal more State conduct which can violate the general obligation in Article 23.1 to have recourse to, and abide by, the rules and procedures of the DSU than the instances especially singled out in Article 23.2.
Article 23 interdicts, thus, more than action in specific disputes, it also provides discipline for the general process WTO Members must follow when seeking redress of WTO inconsistencies. A violation of the explicit provisions of Article 23 can, therefore, be of two different kinds. It can be caused
(a)by an ad hoc, specific action in a given dispute, or
(b)by measures of general applicability, e.g. legislation or regulations, providing for a certain process to be followed which does not, say, include recourse to the DSU dispute settlement system or abide by the rules and procedures of the DSU.”
Furthermore, as to Art. 23 of the DSU, the Panel in US-Import Measures (DS165) confirms the ruling developed in US-Sections 301-310, and states: 2
“The Panel believes that the adopted Panel Report on United States - Sections 301-310 of the Trade Act of 1974 (‘US - Section 301’) has confirmed the crucial importance that WTO Members place on the dispute settlement system of the WTO, as the exclusive means to redress any violations of any provisions of the WTO Agreement. This fundamental principle is embedded in Article 23 of the DSU: …
An important reason why Article 23 of the DSU must be interpreted with a view to prohibiting any form of unilateral action is because such unilateral actions threaten the stability and predictability of the multilateral trade system, a necessary component for "market conditions conducive to individual economic activity in national and global markets" which, in themselves, constitute a fundamental goal of the WTO. Unilateral actions are, therefore, contrary to the essence of the multilateral trade system of the WTO. As stated in the Panel Report on US - Section 301:
‘7.75 Providing security and predictability to the multilateral trading system is another central object and purpose of the system which could be instrumental to achieving the broad objectives of the Preamble. Of all WTO disciplines, the DSU is one of the most important instruments to protect the security and predictability of the multilateral trading system and through it that of the market-place and its different operators. DSU provisions must, thus, be interpreted in the light of this object and purpose and in a manner which would most effectively enhance it.’
The structure of Article 23 is that the first paragraph states the general prohibition or general obligation, i.e. when Members seek the redress of a WTO violation, they shall do so only through the DSU. This is a general obligation. Any attempt to seek ‘redress’ can take place only in the institutional framework of the WTO and pursuant to the rules and procedures of the DSU.
The prohibition against unilateral redress in the WTO sectors is more directly provided for in the second paragraph of Article 23. From the ordinary meaning of the terms used in the chapeau of Article 23.2 (‘in such cases, Members shall’), it is also clear that the second paragraph of Article 23 is ‘explicitly linked to, and has to be read together with and subject to, Article 23.1’. That is to say, the specific prohibitions of paragraph 2 of Article 23 have to be understood in the context of the first paragraph, i.e. when such action is performed by a WTO Member with a view to redressing a WTO violation.
We also agree with the US - Section 301 Panel Report that Article 23.2 contains ‘egregious examples of conduct that contradict the rules of the DSU’ and which constitute more specific forms of unilateral actions, otherwise generally prohibited by Article 23.1 of the DSU.
‘[t]hese rules and procedures [Article 23.1] clearly cover much more than the ones specifically mentioned in Article 23.2. There is a great deal more State conduct which can violate the general obligation in Article 23.1 to have recourse to, and abide by, the rules and procedures of the DSU than the instances especially singled out in Article 23.2.’
The same Panel identified a few examples of such instances where the DSU could be violated contrary to the provisions of Article 23. Each time a Member seeking the redress of a WTO violation is not abiding by a rule of the DSU, it thus violates Article 23.1 of the DSU.
In order to verify whether individual provisions of Article 23.2 have been infringed (keeping in mind that the obligation to also observe other DSU provisions can be brought under the umbrella of Article 23.1), we must first determine whether the measure at issue comes under the coverage of Article 23.1. In other words, we need to determine whether Article 23 is applicable to the dispute before addressing the specific violations envisaged in the second paragraph of Article 23 of the DSU or elsewhere in the DSU.
Article 23.1 of the DSU provides that the criterion for determining whether Article 23 is applicable is whether the Member that imposed the measure was ‘seeking the redress of’ a WTO violation. …
The term ‘seeking’ or ‘to seek’ is defined in the Webster New Encyclopedic Dictionary as: ‘to resort to, … to make an attempt, try’. This term would therefore cover situations where an effort is made to redress WTO violations (whether perceived or WTO determined violations). The term ‘to redress’ is defined in the New Shorter Oxford English Dictionary as ‘repair (an action); atone for (a misdeed); remedy or remove; to set right or rectify (injury, a wrong, a grievance etc.); obtaining reparation or compensation’. The term ‘redress’ is defined in the New Shorter Oxford English Dictionary as: ‘reparation of or compensation for a wrong or consequent loss; remedy for or relief from some trouble; correction or reformation of something wrong’. The term 'redress' implies, therefore, a reaction by a Member against another Member, because of a perceived (or WTO determined) WTO violation, with a view to remedying the situation.
Article 23.1 of the DSU prescribes that when a WTO Member wants to take any remedial action in response to what it views as a WTO violation, it is obligated to have recourse to and abide by the DSU rules and procedures. In case of a grievance on a WTO matter, the WTO dispute settlement mechanism is the only means available to WTO Members to obtain relief, and only the remedial actions envisaged in the WTO system can be used by WTO Members. The remedial actions relate to restoring the balance of rights and obligations which form the basis of the WTO Agreement, and include the removal of the inconsistent measure, the possibility of (temporary) compensation and, in last resort, the (temporary) suspension of concessions or other obligations authorised by the DSB (Articles 3.7 and 22.1 of the DSU). The latter remedy is essentially retaliatory in nature.”
【NOTE】:
1. See, in detail, WT/DS152/R/7.38-7.46.
2. See, in detail, WT/DS165/R/6.13-6.23.
List of References
1 Sources of Legal Texts: http://www.wto.org; WTO Secretariat: The WTO Dispute Settlement Procedures (Second Edition), CAMBRIDGE UNIVERSITY PRESS, 2001.
